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In “The Republic” Plato primarily discussed the idea of 
justice, by exposing correlations between human soul and political 
order. He relates the realm of private property, market relationships, 
and profit-oriented mind with the lowest social class, which 
corresponds to the domain of lust and pleasure in human soul. 
Higher rated social classes or abilities of soul are only responsible 
for the well-being of society and for the establishment of harmony in 
human soul. In “Laws” he developed an idea of a permanent 
training against the domination of excessive pleasure, as the basic 
condition for setting up a society in accordance with human nature. 
The neoliberal concept of economic order not only questions, 
but silently denies such or similar perceptions of humanity. 
Emphasizing market as a regulator of all social relationships and 
human values, it presumes the highest value of greedy accumulation 
of money, power, or material possessions. Simultaneously, it implies 
plutocracy as an ideal of social order. 
 In this paper we intend to discuss that contrast, including 
the opposition of Keynesianism and Friedmanism in modern 
economics.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In his recently published book entitled Keynes: The Return of the 
Master, Robert Skidelsky mentioned Plato or Platonism exactly seven times. 
Each time these names intended to connote an idealized, non-realistic theory 
or inclination. He used them in accordance with theordinary way of 
presenting Plato’s philosophy in educational institutions and overviews of 
so-called “great philosophers” worldwide. 
 On the other hand, dictionaries define “plutocracy” as “a country 
which is ruled by its wealthiest people, or a class of wealthy people who 
rule a country”. (Sinclair, 1998, p.1267) Hence, one is most likely to 
interpret the title of this paper as an opposition between idealistic attitude 
and ruling of the rich. Does it make sense? Hardly. 
 But, perhaps, we should not take these usual meanings too literally. 
For, if one takes a look over the books written about Plato in last 30-40 
years – e.g. only by Croatian authors – one would realize that the label 
mentioned above is an oversimplified misinterpretation of something that 
could be called “Plato’s philosophy”. Namely, his thoughts – particularly in 
his late age – approach human nature in order to deal seriously with its most 
tricky features, contrary to any sort of unrealistic idealization. Even his 
“theory of ideas” has nothing to do with idealization. Anyhow, wouldn’t it 
be surprising that pure drive to see things better than they are has caused 
such a glory and authority over two and half millenniums? 
 In this paper Plato is not a personification of some attitude or 
inclination, but the representative of his own thoughts related to the topic 
co-determined by the term “plutocracy” – derived from the ancient Greek 
plouto-kratia: oligarchy of wealth (Liddell-Scott, 1976, p.1432). It’s well 
known that throughout the human history small groups of rich people were 
ruling from time to time, in different types of social orders – slavery, 
feudalism, capitalism, socialism. But, in this occasion we are not interested 
in the rule of the rich in its historical manifestations. We rather intend to 
focus on plutocracy as an expression of a certain cultural tendency, as the 
rule of “the idea of wealth” or wealth itself. Or, to put it in the contemporary 
context – as Skidelsky (2009, p.133) interpreted one Alastair Darling’s 
statement – “he seemed to be saying that the fault lay in a money-obsessed 
culture – one in which money had become the measure of all things”. In 
other words (Ferguson, 2008), the planet Money increasingly overshadows 
the planet Earth. The ascent of man as a thinker, which took place in last 
four millenniums, has been replaced by the ascent of man as a banker.  
Pascal Bruckner explained the possibility of domination of such a 
plutocratic drive or passion claiming that money is 
 
“a miraculous consolation. As long as we make efforts to earn, save or spend it, it 
absorbs all energy, it is self-sufficient, it makes life perfectly meaningful. It’s imbued 
with strong forces, too strong to tolerate any competition. As it is well known to the 
Church, it’s the only rival to the God, equally able to embrace the manifold of the 
world in its unity, to limit its expansion. To tell the truth, it is the only absolute 
accepted in the age of relativism.” (Bruckner, 2004, p.31) 
 
Culture obsessed with wealth or money as a universal measure or 
the new absolute versus Plato’s or genuine Platonic ideas about the culture 
based on taking into account the wholeness of human nature – that is 
exactly the topic of this paper.  
 
2.  ECONOMY, ECONOMICS, AND ECONOMISM 
Would it be surprising if one raise an objection that there is no 
versus, i.e. no opposition between obsession with money and human nature? 
For, more than three centuries ago western societies started being dominated 
by people like John Law, obsessed with making money, with the world 
market, banks, investments, stocks and stock-exchange, i surance, etc. – 
and nowadays such a tendency is booming. Therefore, it’s getting harder to 
disagree with Karl Marx’s statement, that economic relationships determine 
all other aspects of life. One might conclude that we are predetermined by 
nature to strive for wealth more than for anything else, that we are first and 
foremost interminably accumulating, i.e. plutocratic beings. 
 However, should millenniums when it was not the case be 
overlooked, epochs when people were occupied with some other ideas or 
values – religious, military, ethical, aesthetic? Times when economics as a 
science did not exist, when economy was considered as a pure means of 
survival (oikonomia: management of a household or family) (Liddell-Scott, 
1976, p.1204), and wealth as a desirable support, nt as a final goal? Recent 
publicly widely discussed expectations from economics suggest that such 
epochs slipped one’s attention. 
  
„Today, wealth increase is the only goal western society has to offer. The previous 
great competing objects of striving – military glory and eternal bliss – are radically 
out of favor.” (Skidelsky, 2009, p.134) 
 
It seems to be taken for granted among general people that the 
same human activity which allegedly caused the global crisis, together with 
the accompanying science, can solve it. Not only media, but almost all 
social institutions elevate the conomic standpoint as the most relevant, 
unavoidable in discussing any problem in this world. In Bruckner’s words: 
 
“Capitalism obviously desecrated everything: customs, habits, believes – except 
capitalism itself, which avoided skepticism towards great conceptions of the world. 
The triumph of economism, namely the elevation of asingle discipline into absolute 
science, the mother of all sciences, that aspires, l k  in Marx’s example, to rule social, 
political, and intimate life, and, starting from it’s own postulates, to restructure the 
whole universe.”  (Bruckner, 2004, p.90-91) 
 
 The most discussed problem in recent economics is the world 
market: should it be regulated by state governments or left to itself? The 
related questions are: How much is the market predictable? Is it able to 
perform self-regulation? It’s evident that the topic is not man, human being 
as such, but one of social constructions lifted to the metaphysical level. 
Market is the subject of interest as the most vivid and the most important 
entity in the world, omnipresent and omnipotent.  
 Should such an elevation be taken for granted as the only, or 
perhaps the most progressive, option in the course of history? What are the 
conditions of possibility for that elevation? Does it assume some specific 
perception and comprehension of humanity and of human togetherness, 
strange to all previous historical epochs? 
 Philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Eugen 
Fink made it clear that economism was unavoidable in the Modern History, 
due to domination of the new scientific method and of the idea of unlimited 
man’s freedom (regarding God and nature). Relaying o  numbers, images, 
and symbols – as Damir Barbarić (2001, p.13-39) interprets – new sciences 
have introduced radical relativism into human consciousness, a universal 
and endless replaceability. On the other hand, starting from the Renaissance, 
man has perceived himself as the measure of all things, absolutely 
unrestrained – but in the meantime he has shown incapacity to deal with 
such a freedom: after becoming saturated, he escaped from it into the 
passivity of the mass-behavior and simultaneously into the “hectic 
restlessness of uncontainable work and production”. These controversial, 
chaotic attitudes and circumstances – “the whirl of infinity” – have caused 
the reduction of society to the never-ending process of universal trade and 
exchange, i.e. market. 
 Hence, plutocracy is the mental and the social expression of such a 
historical constellation, and economism is the corresponding theoretical 
reaction. What about economists? Do they take that constellation as a 
normal, acceptable – maybe even desirable – conditi of the mankind? 
 
 The well-known fact is that we live under the dominat on of 
neoliberal economic theory inaugurated half a century ago by Milton 
Friedman, in his programmatic work Capitalism and Freedom. In that 
period of time, until early 80s, widely accepted economic worldview was 
the one represented by John Maynard Keynes. The recent crisis of the world 
market made him actual again, as the most prominent Friedman’s opponent. 
Is the opposition between two of them a sufficient theoretical background 
for discussing and maybe even solving the crisis? Is the solution to the 
market crisis the recovery and stabilization of the market or perhaps 




3. FRIEDMAN VERSUS KEYNES-SKIDELSKY 
 Let’s start with Friedman’s basic teaching. He took f r granted that 
capitalism, as a huge profit-making mechanism, should and is able to take 
care of the wholeness of human lives under the conditi  that politicians 
leave the market function spontaneously. Plutocracy as an obsession with 
amassing, the spiritus movens of such a mechanism, was his unquestioned 
starting position. Average hominids, i.e. social individuals, were not 
perceived as distinctive, mysterious, unique beings, but as “human capital” 
(Friedman, 2009, p.102) or “human resources” (ibid, p.107), who serve the 
running of such an industry. Free market is a guarantee that their other 
individual goals, purposes, and freedoms could be realized in societies 
worldwide. (ibid, p.200) All kinds of “collective states” are considered to be 
a “horror”. (ibid, p.201)  
 
“Economic freedom is an end in itself. In the second place, economic freedom is also 
an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom”. (ibid, p.8) 
“Indeed, a major aim of the liberal is to leave theethical problem for the individual to 
wrestle with it.” (ibid, p.12) 
 
 Such a teaching begs for some questions. First of all, should some 
kind of obsession be left to determine the wholeness of human existence? 
Aren’t we somehow rational beings by nature? Friedman admits that we are, 
primarily in foreseeing future events at the market and in being able to 
calculate future risks and to act accordingly – but, inside of his horizons, our 
rationality doesn’t seem to be strong enough to deal with obsessions, to rule 
over them. Or, perhaps, thirst for infinite accumulation should be taken as a 
tolerable, even desirable, useful or noble obsession, which should not be 
questioned? 
Secondly, does a free market exist at all? Has it ever xisted? Do 
restrained or powerless governments prove the lack of market control – 
usually carried out invisibly by powerful politicians, intelligence agencies 
and media owners in tandem with omnipotent multinational companies? In 
addition, should one ignore the hidden world oligarchy of extremely rich 
ancient bankers’ families intensively involved in semi-secret associations, 
like Bilderbergs, Trilateral Commission, Council onForeign Relations, and 
many others? Perhaps they are not interested and not active in market 
regulation? Isn’t there, from day to day, more and more evidence that at 
least in last several centuries the world events were and still are stage-
managed by rude plutocrats? In The Shock Doctrine Naomi Klein offers a 
lot of well documented proves that they are. She annou ced them in this 
way: 
 
“This book is a challenge to the central and most cherished claim in the official story 
– that the triumph of deregulated capitalism has been born of freedom, that unfettered 
free markets go hand in hand with democracy. Instead, I will show that this 
fundamentalist form of capitalism has consistently been midwifed by the most brutal 
forms of coercion, inflicted on the collective body politic as well as on countless 
individual bodies. The history of the contemporary free market – better understood as 
the rise of corporatism – was written in shocks.” (Klein, 2007, p.18-19) 
 
Thirdly, could and should human beings be brought down, reduced 
to a sort of capital or resource – like real estate or natural raw-materials? On 
the other hand, is it really our natural existential position to be placed at 
somebody’s disposal, to be on call, available for some usage, perhaps like 
tools, sand or electricity?  
Fourthly, are we truly self-made, autochthonous social individuals 
and simultaneously the only ones who should take responsibility for ethical 
issues? Do we grow up and pursue our goals and purposes intellectually and 
emotionally independently from others? Is collectivism avoidable at all? 
Isn’t some sort of it inherent to the human nature? On the other hand, should 
social institutions and collectives feel ethically irresponsible? Basically, 
does it make sense to speak about ethics at all in such an imagined 
extremely individualistic context? 
Finally, how can any kind of freedom be an end in itself – freedom 
for the sake of freedom? And at the same time a means for some other sort 
of freedom. Does it make a logical sense? And, in ge eral, are economic and 
political freedoms sufficient to offer us a fulfillment of living – or we find 
them desirable as means for some other, more essential, perhaps non-
economic and non-political goals? 
 
 It seems that Friedman’s attempt to justify plutocracy left too many 
open questions, because his statements are based in too many prejudices or 
unconvincing evaluations. Nonetheless, his neoliberal theory was widely 
accepted not only by rich plutocrats, but also by scholars, namely 
economists who relayed on mathematically supported s lf-confidence in 
predicting the future of the market. Five years agosome of them, acting as 
bankers, made some crucial mistakes, and the market did not respond with 
an expected self-regulation. The recent crisis made visible some systematic 
theoretical errors and limits of our rational capabilities to foresee the future 
– surprisingly, much more visible than 40 years of ethically unacceptable, 
disastrous implementation of Friedman’s economic ideology worldwide. 
 
 What about ideas of Friedman’s opponent – Keynes? L t’s evoke 
some of them following his esteemed biographer Skidelsky. In his opinion, 
Keynes was “the most brilliant non-economist who ever applied himself to 
the study of economics”. (Skidelsky, 2009, p.55) 
 
“Keynes was a moralist. There was always, at the back of his mind, the question: 
What is economics for? How does economic activity relate to the ‘good life’? How 
much prosperity do we need to live ‘wisely, agreeably, and well”? […] Broadly, 
Keynes saw economic progress in freeing people from physical toil, so they could 
learn to live like the ‘lilies on the field’, valuing today over tomorrow, taking 
pleasure in the fleeting moment.” (ibid, p.xvii) His additional question was: “If 
growth is a means to an end, what is the end, how much growth is ‘enough’, and what 
other valuable human purposes may be pre-emptied by a single-minded concentration 
on economic growth?” (ibid, p.ix) 
 
 Obviously, Keynes’s approach to economics and economy was 
pretty different from Friedman’s. His standpoint was outside the economic 
science and all economic activities – primarily based in ethics. His ambition 
was to answer questions about the position and the role of the economic 
dimension of living in the broader context of human existence. In order to 
establish a “harmonious society” (ibid, p.190), he was teaching that 
 
“the pursuit of money – what he called ‘love of money’ – was justified only to the 
extent that it led to a ‘good life’. And a good life was not what made people better 
off: it was what made them good. To make the world ethically better was the only 
justifiable purpose of economic striving.” (ibid, p.133) Therefore, “capitalism is 
merely an instrument. Liberty and justice, for example, are not ‘goods in 
themselves’ but means to the realization of intrinsic goods.” (ibid, p.138) 
 
 In order to put capitalistic economy in the right course, Keynes 
recommended avoiding of “inescapable uncertainty about the future” (ibid, 
p.xv) by introducing “continuous role of government” (ibid, p.xvii) in the 
regulation of the market. In his opinion – opposite to Friedman’s – future 
risks cannot be calculated in advance, because some a ount of 
unpredictability always remains. Hence, 
 
“prudence in face of the unknown is the key to Keynes’s philosophy of 
statesmanship.” (ibid, p.158) In addition, he “looked to an ‘educated bourgeoisie’ to 
set political standards to the community” (ibid, p.159), he “thought that, with the 
separation of management from ownership, public motives would increasingly 
come to dominate in the conduct of large enterprises. He did not foresee that the 
private interests of managers would come to take precedence in both private and 
public spheres”. (ibid, p.166) Finally, “he treated justice instrumentally, as 
contributing to a ‘contented’ society. In this respct, he comes closest to the idea of 
justice as ‘fairness’. By ‘fairness’ he usually meant the social arrangements 
generally accepted in the society he best knew, Britain.” (ibid, p.147) 
 
 Such Skidelsky’s interpretations and comments of Keynes’s 
thoughts are supplemented with some more profound critical objections.  
 
“Keynes’s speculations on the theme of the ‘love of m ney’ are the nexus that binds 
together his ethical theory and his economic theory. But the coherence is only 
partial. His economic theory attacks the hoarding aspect of ‘love of money’, but not 
the priority given to moneymaking. […] So, one has put up with what is ‘faul’ to 
get quickly to ‘fair’. But a life dedicated to a ‘faul’ set of values cannot be an entry 
ticket to a life with a ‘fair’ set.” (ibid, p.146)  
 
 Therefore, he calls Keynes’s speculations “ethical utopia”. (ibid.) 
Later, after listing Keynes’s basic ideas, he state:  
 
“Having said this, it is easy to see that he might have been deluding himself. He 
envisaged a modern capitalist economy governed by a Platonic ideal, and 
gentlemanly codes of behavior. But once the capitalist genie is let out of the bottle it 
cannot be pressed into the service of pre-modern ethics of a good life and pre-
modern codes of behavior. The good life in the classical sense presupposes that 
human desire has some ultimate end, or telos, whereas modern economic theory and 
life presuppose that it is insatiable. As regards behavior, he took for granted a class-
based system of values which economic progress was undermining. These were 
contradictions which Keynes never fully faced.” (ibid, p.153) 
 
 On the basis of experiencing social life more than lf century after 
Keynes’s death, Skidelsky expressed two key-insight of his own: 
 
1. “Today we would say that the Moore-Keynes goal of maximizing the 
quantity of goodness in the universe cannot provide an agreed criterion for 
economic action, because rational people disagree about what is good. Economics 
therefore is bound to take wants as data and treat h  maximization problem in 
terms of wants satisfaction. This is a problem for any attempt to marry ethics and 
economics. We can ease it, but not remove it entirely, by constructing indexes of 
‘well-being’ which contain ‘quality-of-life’ measures.” (ibid, p.140) 
2. “An economy devoted to the manufacture of goods may be said to have a 
natural terminus when wants are satisfied. Advertising may postpone it, but it 
cannot remove the day of fulfillment. But an economy which makes money into 
goods has no such cutoff point because, as Keynes said, abstract money will always 
seem more attractive than concrete goods. Our imaginations race ahead of our 
senses, filling us with unsatisfied desires, and money is the continuous stimulator of 
our imagination, creating a perpetual sense of dissatisfaction with what we already 
have.” (ibid, p.145) 
 
 Finally, as a sort of solution of the problem, he states that “we need 
a new synthesis, in which government is accepted as non-benevolent, but 
market forces are not thereby totally rehabilitated.” (ibid, p.173) 
 
4. SPECIFYING THE PROBLEM 
 Yes, we would agree with Skidelsky, we need a new synthesis in 
order to establish – as Keynes calls it – harmonious society. But, what kind 
of synthesis? Both of them are concerned with the relationship between 
markets and governments as the key-factor in solving broader problems – 
e.g. just mentioned relativism of values and the lack of limits in striving for 
abstract wealth and in satisfying endless desire. Wren’t they perceived as 
the biggest obstacles not only in taking care of ethics at the social level, but 
also in an individual experience of meaningful living?  
 Widespread and radical relativism and the lack of limits, leading 
into nihilism, were the topic of Nietzsche’s thoughts, almost century and 
half ago. His deep insights in dimensions of the modern crisis of humanity 
made it clear that pure economic problems were just a particular aspect of 
much wider and more profound crisis of the “working culture” itself. In the 
aphorism entitled Leisure and idleness Nietzsche (1976, p.259) states: 
 
“Even now one is ashamed of resting, and prolonged reflection almost gives people 
a bad conscience. One thinks with a watch in one’s hand, even as one eats one’s 
midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one 
always ‘might miss something’. ‘Rather do anything than nothing’: this principle, 
too, is merely a string to throttle all culture and good taste. […] If sociability and 
the arts still offer any delight, it is the kind ofdelight that slaves, weary of their 
work, devise for themselves. […] Soon we may well rach the point where people 
can no longer give in to the desire of vita contemplativa (that is, taking a walk with 
ideas and friends) without self-contempt and a bad conscience.” 
 
 The attentive lecture of at least Nietzsche’s works would have 
helped both Keynes and Skidelsky to realize that, even though the powerful 
bankers, managers and politicians, together with the leading economists, 
might shape destinies of billions of people, their deeds are not the cause, but 
an expression of the contemporary crisis, and hence cannot solve it – no 
matter how much ethically aware or benevolent they are, and how much 
they let each others act independently. Even if they w re the cause of the 
corruption of humanity, does it imply that they areble to correct it? 
It seems that the “working culture” itself, as a sort f unnatural 
social disharmony, should be taken as the core of the problem. But, in order 
to face the problem appropriately, one should ask about the condition of 
possibility not only of a workaholic culture, but even more, of any culture in 
which any kind of obsession, i.e. lust or passion, rules over reasonable ideas 
and evaluations. Where to search for it, if not in human nature? Some 
deeper insights might prove that the whole context of contemporary living, 
including plutocracy, is perhaps just a new modification of something that 
was historically and essentially déjà vu. 
 Another Nietzsche’s aphorism, entitled How things will become 
more “artistic” in Europe, suggests that it’s exactly the case. The aphorism 
deals with the more profound and widespread phenomen – man’s 
obsession with acting, improvising, and experimenting with himself. Having 
started in the Periclean age in Athens, it was suppressed in the Middle Ages, 
and revitalized in modern times, in America as well as in Europe. What are 
its social consequences? 
 
“For what is dying out is the fundamental faith that would enable us to calculate, to 
promise, to anticipate the future in plans of such s ope, and to sacrifice the future to 
them – namely, the faith that man has value and meaning only insofar as he is a stone 
in a great edifice; and to that end he must be solid first of all, a ‘stone’ – and above all 
not an actor! 
To say it briefly (for a long time people will still keep silent about it): What will not be 
built any more, is – a society in the old sense of that word; to build that, everything is 
lacking, above all the material. All of us are no longer material for a society; his is a 
truth for which the time has come.” (Nietzsche, 1976, p.303-304) 
 
 It seems that the source of the global confusion and crisis has its 
roots deeper in us, even beyond the modern workaholism: we don’t hesitate 
to ignore all natural boundaries, because “the indiv dual becomes convinced 
that he can do just about everything and can manage almost any role” 
(ibid.). Hence, we became again, like in ancient times, unpredictable actors, 
improvisers unable to perform any long-lasting social role – but now being 
simultaneously exposed to “breathless haste”, which deprives us of true 
cultural values, taste, delight, even any serious thinking. Extreme relativism 
of social roles imbued with radical deprivations – can it offer or create 
anything good?  
 But maybe Nietzsche was wrong!? He claimed all of that long time 
ago. However, wouldn’t it be hard to prove that his diagnosis isn’t 
nowadays even truer? For, it’s impossible to deny that man today is 
increasingly and systematically cut off from too many constitutive elements 
of traditionally perceived humanity. Hence, a “new synthesis” should 
perhaps primarily tend towards connecting confused in ividuals, tired 
workers-actors, with their human essence or authentic ature, and, in 
addition, towards joining such refreshed beings in some sort of originally 
human community. Could it be achieved by synthesizing somehow the 
existing governments and the market? Is it primarily a political-economic 
task? 
 
 Around two and half millenniums ago – exactly in the Periclean 
age, in some essential aspects very similar to ours – there was a philosopher 
who inspired Nietzsche and some others to deal with such tricky traits and 
deprivations of human nature and their mental, intellectual, and social 
consequences. He was searching not only for the origin of man’s 
obsessions, but also for the long-lasting prevention of social problems 
caused by “artistic” and furious lusts or attitudes. 
 
5. PLATO 
 According to Plato’s basic insight into human nature, we are not 
initially and primarily rational beings, but beings exposed to pain and 
pleasure. Our spontaneous behavior is irrational escaping from pain towards 
pleasure. The most painful feeling is the one of the limitedness of our 
lifetime, caused by the awareness of our mortality. We don’t know what 
death is, hence we are afraid of it. We only know that it’s some sort of 
stiffness and resting of our body, and we feel thataging makes us more and 
more inflexible and immovable. Therefore, even as kid  we instinctively try 
to escape from it into the pleasure of frantic moving and shouting, striving 
for permanent pleasure if possible. 
 Pleasure itself is furious, it tends to get rid of any form or 
limitation, and drives towards absence of law, wanton ess, self-admiration, 
trendiness, shamelessness, muddle, and self-conceit. At the social level, the 
domination of pleasure leads necessarily to injustice. 
 In The Republic, Plato (Burnet, 1900-1907, vol. IV) positioned the
people ruled by lust and pleasure – the vast majority – nto the third social 
class: only they were allowed to have private propety and to enjoy wealth, 
but they were strictly separated from any kind of gverning city-state and of 
making decisions about social life as a whole. In that way plutocracy could 
never be socially established, because the rich would be subjected to those 
who, in the process of educational selection, showed higher and broader 
abilities: to protect or to rule the state. The constitution of their souls should 
become free of lust, greed, fear or immoderate pleasure. The rulers should 
be those who are panoptikoi – able to comprehend the wholeness and the 
hierarchy of human ideas, feelings, attitudes, and ctivities, and to rule by 
giving each of them an adequate importance and role. Doing so, they would 
establish justice: everybody’s engagement in a domain of his/her abilities 
and competencies. More precisely: 
 
“Justice of a polis does not simply consist of everybody’s performing his own tasks – 
that is, Socrates says, an outward doing one’s own,and only the image of justice. The 
heart of justice is achieved if each individual, doing his own, becomes reasonable, 
true, and just. It means that inner order, harmony, friendship, and interconnectedness 
of the whole – in one word: justice and the beauty of the soul – does not rescue or 
support only someone’s job which corresponds to his natural abilities, but first of all 
him personally, as the actuality of his own nature, established by the performed job.” 
(Šegedin, 2012, p.100) 
 
 In his latest work, Laws, Plato (Burnet, 1900-1907, vol. V) 
presented the way how to intensify basic educational efforts in order to 
overcome drive towards excessive pleasure. In accordance with the ancient, 
almost forgotten practice, he found emotional influence – persuasion and 
instigation – more efficient than rational one. During repeated celebrations 
filled with divine gifts – like wine and music-dance full of rhythm and 
harmony – citizens should exercise how to fight with pleasure in a tricky 
way: not by escaping from it, but by facing it in playing festal games 
controlled by older and reasonable ones, enjoying it, and, simultaneously, 
restraining it. The expected outcome should be fearlessness in accepting our 
own mortality, and, in addition, modesty, shyness, tranquility, and 
everything else contrary to what was already mentioned as a destructive trait 
of pleasure. In other words: 
 
“Plato’s demand, on which all his efforts in Laws are focused, is: man should be 
strong enough to live through his lifetime ‘in confrmity with the core of his nature’ 
(804b1), i.e. being a god’s toy – what truly is hisbest trait – he should live ‘playing 
the most beautiful games’ (803c). […] Playing game really is the hardest and the 
most serious activity, it is exactly the biggest and the most difficult war which alone 
trains us for genuine fearlessness and complete virtue. In game one experiences entire 
mysteriousness and wonder of his own nature, and exercises courage to endure 
essential ignorance and to spend life in harmony with such a nature. Incurably and 
inevitably mortal, he awakens and develops in himself – by playing game – shyness, 
which prevents him from abandoning his nature in the case of intoxication with the 
seductiveness of pleasure. Life in game – as an imitation of god’s serenity during 
withstanding man’s essential ignorance and during lving without retreat man’s 
mortality – being ‘the best life’ is ‘the truest tragedy’ and ‘the most brilliant drama’ 
(817b).” (Barbarić, 1986, p.80) 
 
 Establishing our own natural attitude by playing hard and beautiful 
games; being exposed to pleasure but not being overc me by it; being 
permanently at war with ourselves in order to become brave enough to face 
reality – all of that versus unconditional surrender to fear and obsessive 
search for pleasure in escaping from our genuine nature: escaping into 
“theatrocracy” (Plato) or tireless improvising and workaholism (Nietzsche), 
as well as – into plutocracy. 
 
6. COMPARISONS 
 Close to the end of his book Skidelsky discusses how to educate 
future economists. He recommends to educators:  
 
“They would take as their motto Keynes’s dictum that ‘economics is a moral and not a 
natural science’: that the economist should be ‘mathematician, historian, statesman 
and philosopher… in some degree’, and that ‘no part of man’s nature or his institutions 
must be entirely outside his regard’”. (Skidelsky, 2009, p.189) 
 
 Keynes himself was all of that, but maybe not in a sufficient 
degree, because his social ideas were obviously utopian. His idea of justice 
was geographically and essentially pretty limited, his expectations from 
managers separated from ownership were proved unreasonable, and his 
notion of “educated bourgeoisie” remained inadequately determined. And 
above all, one should agree with Skidelsky’s objection hat living under the 
rule of immoderate, plutocratic drives and pleasure cannot lead to the rule 
of moderation and modesty, namely to living “wisely, agreeably, and well” 
– it simply does not match with human nature. Basically, Keynes let Plato’s 
lowest class (The Republic) or untrained citizens (Laws) rule the state, 
expecting from them some kind of self-regulation, namely, self-
transformation into something opposite from what they are. Friedman had 
similar expectations from the world market: no matter how people behave, 
what they are obsessed with, what mistakes they make – the free market 
should spontaneously correct all of them and establi h a sort of ethically 
neutral economic harmony. Therefore, compared with Plato’s ideas, Keynes 
might be called a naïve idealist; but compared to the doctrine of Friedman’s 
Chicago School, he might be called a deep and refined humanist. 
 
“The Chicago School strain of capitalism does indeed have something in common 
with other dangerous ideologies: the signature desire for unattainable purity, for a 
clean slate on which to build a reengineered model society. This desire for godlike 
powers of total creation is precisely why freemarket id ologues are so drawn to crises 
and disasters. Nonapocalyptic reality is simply not h spitable to their ambitions… It 
is in these malleable moments, when we are psychologically unmoored and 
physically uprooted, that these artists of the realplunge in their hands and begin their 
work of remaking the world.” (Klein, 2007, p.20-21) 
 
 Anyhow, the point of contact in the teachings mentioned above – 
except Friedman’s – is emphasizing immodesty as the main problem, and 
the role of education in solving it. The main distinction between Plato nd 
Keynes-Skidelsky lays in the positioning of the source of the problem: two 
of them place the main confrontation between market forces and 
governments; Plato places it inside human nature – between reason and 
drives, self-control and surrendering to pleasure. In his opinion, the essential 
purpose of educational training is to encourage and to enable human reason 
to fight permanently and successfully with our weaknesses, primarily with 
hedonism, which is the root, among other things, of plutocracy – in human 
soul as well as in society. Keynes, on the other side, was too tolerant 
towards unrestrained hedonism: he didn’t realize its long-lasting destructive 
and irreparable impact – at the individual and at the social level. Skidelsky 
is aware of all of that, but still thinks that a shift in political-economic 
relations might overcome plutocratic drive and solve the crisis successfully. 
 One might ask: Is it really important who appears to be a temporary 
master on the world stage – businessman, politician, or average consumer – 
if each of them is submitted to the domination of pleasure: the obsession 
with infinite profit, unlimited power, unending consumption, mixed with 
each other? Isn’t such a global “society” necessarily a vicious circle of 
competition, manipulation, ruthlessness, aggression, deception, threatening, 
etc. in a public life, and confusion, stressfulness, illusive enthusiasm, 
exhausting fight, disappointment and depression, superstition, fruitless 
consolation, etc. in an everyday life of individuals?  
 Is such an obsessive and hectic life together withits variations a 
desirable or at least our single option? Do we have ny publicly widely 
accepted, clear idea of some essentially different paradigm of living – based 
not in dreams, but in human nature? Nevertheless, it doesn’t seem hard to 
realize that the only way how to oppose the crisis of humanity – which 
includes economic, political, environmental, identity crises, crisis of 
confidence and self-confidence, of marriage, family, etc. – is the 
establishment of such an education which is directed towards overcoming 
all immoderate tendencies in human souls by making people brave enough 
to face finiteness and natural limitations of everything we deal with, 
including ourselves. 
Hence, plutocratic drive inside and outside of us should not be 
controlled for the sake of some other form of immoderate obsession, but in 
order to introduce the opposite paradigm of living, which primarily includes 
permanent fighting for – always temporary – establishment and re-
establishment of right measure in human souls and in society as a whole. 
How to control plutocracy? Should we, at least for the beginning, 
obsessively fight with it? 
 Pascal Bruckner offered an answer in his awarded book Misery of 
Prosperity. The Religion of Market and Its Enemies: 
 
“To be an ‘anti-capitalist’ first of all means to stop being obsessed with capitalism, to 
think of something else. Instead of being against, why not to step aside, to get out of 
the way? We do it by changing the signs of luxury, at least individually: free time 
instead of big salaries, meditation instead of hectic manner, spiritual life instead of 
mercantile fever, small communities instead of wide world, isolation with chosen 
friends instead of loneliness in crowd.” One should “validate as higher everything 
what doesn’t strictly belong to the category of usef lness, uncountable goods: poetry, 
love, erotic, contemplation of nature, solidarity, everything what surpasses man, what 
lifts him up, releases him from his narrow-mindedness, his monetary mediocrity, his 
maniacal compulsion to accumulate.” (Bruckner, 2004, p.142-143) 
 
Couldn’t this be taken as an unintentional description of the 
members of Plato’s two higher social classes from The Republic or well-
trained citizens from Laws – who let the majority of people remain too weak 




 Let’s ask again: If we value Plato’s, Nietzsche’s, Bruckner’s or 
similar ways of thinking which emphasize fighting for the establishment of 
moderation and measure as a strange and useless, in this moment globally 
inapplicable idealization – what remains? It’s evidnt that there are many 
“realistic” options left – but all of them accept status quo, either explicitly 
or implicitly, either being aware of it or not. For, all ideas of change and 
reform which do not ouch and try to cut off at the roots of the problem, 
make it less visible and indirectly endorse it: economic ideas, as well as 
historical, technological, political, philosophical, educational, 
environmental, etc. Doing so, they – mostly unintentionally, but efficiently 
supporting all those who intentionally manipulate po le’s mind and 
imagination – inhibit us in facing natural puzzles, challenges, and tasks 
related to experiencing and developing our authentic humanity. They 
introduce more and more confusion, disorientation, and unrealistic 
expectations in individual souls and public opinions, transforming 
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